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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow interviewing His Excellency, Tun Dr Mahathir bin 
Mohamad, in Putrajaya on Monday, 12th May 2014. Sir, thank you very 
much indeed for taking part in this project and giving us your valuable 
time. I wonder, Sir, if you could begin please by saying, what was your 
attitude to the Commonwealth when you became Prime Minister of 
Malaysia in 1981? 
 
MM: I felt it was a misnomer. The ‘wealth’ is not ‘common’ at all. It belongs to only 
four members and the rest are poor. So, calling it ‘the Commonwealth’, that is 
common, when obviously wealth is not common; then, I thought it was in the 
first place the wrong name. And to give it that name, it is, in a way, not being 
sincere. So, I thought I would stay away from it. 
 
SO: Did you have a great deal of scepticism, also, because your 
predecessors – as you say in your memoirs – were devoted to the 
Commonwealth and you felt that their attachment to it was misplaced? 
 
MM: When I became Prime Minister, I looked back on what was done before – 
what were the policies and actions before – and I thought that I need to be 
critical if I’m going to do anything at all. I was not quite satisfied with their past 
performance. I was grateful to them because they gained this country 
independence, but I thought that we should do something better for us as a 
nation and for us as a member of the world’s other organisations, including 
the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So, this was a deliberate ordering then of your priorities when you 
became Prime Minister: to put ASEAN, first, then the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, above the 
Commonwealth? 
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MM: Yes. 
 
SO: Sir, how did you come to revise your opinion on the Commonwealth? 
 
MM: Well, I thought I belonged to those other groups more when I was in the 
Commonwealth because there was a kind of unequal role played by the 
different members of the Commonwealth. Mostly, it was very British; [it was] 
very much focused on Britain and its role. If not Britain, then either Canada or 
Australia or New Zealand. And the rest seemed to be followers. They have a 
different role to play and their problems were not really attended to by the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So, Sir, you felt that it was a British and European-dominated 
Commonwealth?  But you came to revisit that opinion? How did you 
come to revise your attitude of the value of the Commonwealth to 
Malaysia? 
 
MM: I did not go to the Commonwealth meeting for a few years and then I decided 
– by that time, of course, Malaysia had changed a little – that Malaysia’s 
experience was also relevant to the development of the poorer members of 
the Commonwealth, and I need to contact them. Actually, I invited many 
Commonwealth leaders to come to Malaysia. They did not accept my 
invitation. By that, I mean, they didn’t say they didn’t accept, but they just 
didn’t come here. I suspect it was because they felt, ‘What is the point of 
going to another developing country like them?’ They had nothing to gain, 
nothing to learn from us. By then, Malaysia had actually shown early signs of 
development and I felt that our experience could contribute to their own 
development: the problems we faced, the policies we adopted and all that. 
Perhaps this would be relevant. And since they did not consider it worthwhile 
to come here, I felt that if I was active in the Commonwealth and I play host to 
the Commonwealth, they would be forced to come to Malaysia.  
 
SO: So this is why you made that surprise announcement at the Vancouver 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, saying that you would 
host the next meeting in Kuala Lumpur? 
 
MM: Yes. 
 
SO: I note that this came as something of a surprise to some people at the 
CHOGM. You write in your memoirs that you felt that Sir Sonny Ramphal 
and others may have regarded Malaysia a little as – how did you put it – 
“the prodigal son coming back into the fold.” But this was a very hard-
headed decision that you had made to invite other developing country 
leaders to come to Kuala Lumpur to see what you had achieved in eight 
short years? 
 
MM: It was part of my foreign policy. I adjusted foreign policy to stress more on 
being friendly with developing countries who were in the same category as 
Malaysia. And, since it is not often that they visit Malaysia, but they don’t see 
Malaysia as anything different from them, so they did not respond to my 
invitation. But I thought if I play host to the Commonwealth, they will come. 
 
3 
SO: So, how did Sir Sonny Ramphal try to change your mind before this 
point? 
 
MM: He tried to persuade me. He sent messages to me, asked me to attend the 
Commonwealth Conference and all that. But I had already drawn up all my 
policies and programmes.  Certainly, regarding the Commonwealth, I did not 
visit the developed countries like America, like Britain. I did not visit these 
countries because I felt that these are developed countries: they are not really 
interested in Malaysia. They cannot benefit Malaysia. So, in the 
Commonwealth, these countries are there too, so it is about my foreign policy 
that I should develop friendship with my neighbours, with the small countries, 
with the Pacific islands, with Islamic countries, before I focus on the 
Commonwealth. But there is nothing in my programme about visiting the 
developed countries like America and all that. This came last. I didn’t even 
put it on my agenda. 
 
SO: I know that you went to the CHOGRM, the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Regional Meetings, that were held in Suva in 1982 and then 
in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, in 1984. The Nassau meeting in 
1985 was the first time you had gone to a Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting. Your deputy, Musa Hitam, had represented you at 
previous Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings. How far did 
you also feel that the Commonwealth was not a valuable platform to 
achieve anything for Malaysia, particularly because of apartheid South 
Africa? 
 
MM: Yes, that is one of the things that influenced my thinking: that, even in South 
Africa, the Commonwealth were not doing anything, and their attitude was to 
tolerate apartheid in South Africa. There was a lot of lip service being paid to 
the need to stop this practice, but nothing was done. But, when we came to 
the CHOGRM, this is a big thing that is going to be cited in a developing 
country. So, then I thought I should go. 
 
SO: I’ve read your personal letter to other heads that you wrote before the 
Nassau meeting, arguing very strongly for a firm decision on economic 
and financial sanctions. Looking at the record, your sense of frustration 
at the lack of activity on South Africa comes through very strongly. Did 
you, Sir, ever consider pulling out of the Commonwealth because you 
felt it was just a ‘talking shop’? 
 
MM: Well, I did not think about pulling out. I felt that, at some stage, I may need to 
meet the members of the Commonwealth, especially [those] from the 
developing countries. And that would be an easy access point for me if I stay 
in the Commonwealth. If I had become isolationist, that wouldn’t help at all, 
because we have our neighbour here in Malaysia [Indonesia] who decided to 
pull out of the UN [in 1965-66], and that was not very beneficial to Malaysia. 
So, membership of an organisation is good, as long as you can make yourself 
heard. 
 
SO: Yes. I know, also, that you commissioned a particular review by your 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October of 1986 and also asked ISIS to 
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assess the value and the benefit of the Commonwealth. Were these two 
reports in any way influential to your thinking? 
 
MM: Yes, it brought me to focus on issues that are relevant which could be taken 
up by the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Your importance in Cabinet was remarkable, and yours was the guiding 
voice on foreign policy for Malaysia. But did you use particular 
officials? Were they useful to you as advisors or sounding boards in 
any way, as you came to form and direct your foreign policy? 
 
MM: Yes, there were some very experienced diplomats in the Foreign Office and I 
did listen to them. And I used them to make known my thinking. For example, 
almost immediately after becoming Prime Minister, I brought up the question 
of Antarctica. And this was picked up by the Foreign Affairs Ministry and they 
kept on promoting this idea about Antarctica being a world – as well as a 
national – concern. 
 
SO: I understand that Zakaria Ali and Kamil Jaafar were particularly useful to 
you in helping to implement and manage foreign policy, and also that 
Razali Ismail was a particularly influential Malaysian diplomat and, of 
course, of long standing at the United Nations. 
 
MM: They were people who were very active. They established contact with most 
of the diplomats at the UN and in other countries, and they were all prepared 
to voice the policies of Malaysia, to establish contacts and friendship with 
certain countries, particularly with those which were facing problems. 
 
SO: Sir, in contrast, how valuable to you was the Non-Aligned Movement at 
the same time? 
 
MM: Yes, it is yet another avenue for me to link with developing countries, and for 
that reason I valued the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
SO: I just wondered whether you felt that the Commonwealth in the 1980s 
was too ‘pro-West’? You emphasize Britain and the other Western 
members of the Commonwealth. Even though the Commonwealth is a 
multilateral forum, I wondered if you thought it came across as ‘leaning 
to one side’ in the Cold War? 
 
MM: In my evaluation, the Non-Aligned Movement is far more representative of the 
developing world than the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is a mixture 
of developing and developed world, in which the developed countries were 
very influential and their policies hold sway most of the time. So, I thought 
that the Non-Aligned Movement would be and was a better forum for me. 
 
SO: I know that, at the Belgrade meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in 
1989, Sir Sonny Ramphal suggested to you the idea of a G15. Was this 
something that you had already been contemplating yourself? 
 
MM: It is part of my idea of trying to give voice to some of the developing countries 
of the world, and when he suggested forming this G15, I thought that this was 
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a very good representative group – representing the three continents, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. 
 
SO: I understand that the Latin American countries were less enthusiastic.  
Is it fair to say that? You make this remark in your memoirs. 
 
MM: They were under the influence of America and, also, they felt that countries 
like Malaysia were countries that are not relevant to their affairs and unknown 
to most of them. 
 
SO: So, in this time, when comparing the relative importance to Malaysian 
foreign policy of the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, and 
the United Nations Organisation – obviously, three very different 
organisations of differing sizes – did you put a particular weight towards 
the Non-Aligned Movement rather than the United Nations? Or did you 
pursue Malaysian national interests through each of these 
organisations in parallel? 
 
MM: I would think I would put the Non-Aligned Movement ahead of the United 
Nations because, even then, I thought that the United Nations is a creature of 
the five super-powers who were given veto powers. I don’t like veto powers at 
all. 
 
SO: So, the Non-Aligned Movement, in that it was founded on equality of 
representation and dialogue, was preferable? 
 
MM: It was more democratic. The UN is hardly democratic. 
 
SO: But did the Commonwealth represent a different platform by the end of 
the 1980s, when the crisis in communism was producing a progressive 
sea-change in the international system? I wondered how far you came 
to re-evaluate the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth, 
going into the 1990s. 
 
MM: I still have a preference for the Non-Aligned Movement. And the fact that it 
was less inclined to be of the Eastern camp was, to me, a positive thing, 
because I wanted the Non-Aligned Movement to be truly non-aligned, not 
under the influence of East or West.   
 
SO: Sir, if I could come back, then, to the Commonwealth being of lesser 
importance in your world view. After your decision to host the Kuala 
Lumpur Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, how did you 
manage the conference itself? This was a superb showcase for 
Malaysia, as you say, and as the means to encourage developing heads 
to come to this country. 
 
MM: The first problem was the replacement for Sonny Ramphal. You see, there 
was the contest between the Australian [Malcolm Fraser] and Chief Emeka, 
and I conducted the voting for that and I made the announcement. It was 
Emeka who won. Unfortunately, Fraser decided to leave the country and went 
home: it was a disappointment. But, otherwise, I had a problem because 
Australia and New Zealand were very much against Mrs Thatcher and her 
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policies. And I had to be sure that the conference went on without having an 
open crisis, because I wanted the Commonwealth meeting in Malaysia to be 
a successful meeting. 
 
SO: And it was. I have seen it described in press reports as the most 
successful meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. 
Looking across the long history of Commonwealth Heads meetings, the 
range of decisions made at the Kuala Lumpur summit and the overall 
success of the meeting is very striking.   
 
If I could ask you, please, Sir… When you were deciding on how to 
manage the vote on the next Secretary General, you did it very 
deliberately at the start. I am aware you privately canvassed people’s 
opinions. I understand you didn’t even tell your wife of the division of 
opinion and votes. But this was a very sensitive issue, and people were 
expecting you to take it to the Retreat to discuss and decide. What made 
you decide to do it straight away? 
 
MM: I actually had this approach because we were going to have the meeting after 
that, and we didn’t want this thing to be in the way of our focus. Our attention 
[was] to be on other matters. 
 
SO: So, by dealing with this potentially divisive matter quickly and 
discretely, this ensured then that the discussion would swiftly move on 
to the points under review. The Retreat at Langkawi is known for the 
division, as you say, on South Africa. The Committee of the Foreign 
Ministers on South Africa, under Joe Clark, had already met John Major 
and there had been a very robust discussion. How did you soothe the 
divisions between Australia and New Zealand and Mrs Thatcher? Her 
press conference afterwards was very combative. 
 
MM: Yes, she was combative all the time. But I wanted to reduce the incidents like 
that during the Commonwealth meeting. I tried to make the Retreat a very 
social kind of retreat. We were together to get to know each other, and to 
appreciate that we would not be able to resolve all the problems. The problem 
of South Africa would remain on the agenda. 
 
SO: I know that, in the January of that year, Bob Hawke had already 
proposed that there should be an Asia Pacific Economic Forum, rather 
than the ASEAN ideal and your thoughts to expand it in the South East 
Asia region. However, Bob Hawke’s proposal tended more towards a 
Pacific Rim version of the OECD. Was this something that you also 
discussed at the Retreat?   
 
MM: No, not much. What triggered this idea about having the Asian economic 
community was because of the failure of the GATT. You know, there had 
been meetings so many times and each time they were frustrated by the 
attitudes of the United States and the developed countries. On the one hand, 
they wanted to open up places but they themselves were not opening up. So, 
I said, “Well, if we cannot agree on the larger scale, let’s reduce it to a smaller 
scale.” And, also, I realised that Europe had already moved towards the 
European Union. So, they were more united, they behaved almost like one 
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unified country. America had NAFTA: it was already a very powerful force in 
the world, and in the trade forum GATT. So, I think, in order to give us 
strength on our own, we would not have any influence. Even with ASEAN 
there is not much influence. But if we could have the three north eastern 
Asian countries together in a single forum, then we could speak more strongly 
about our views in international fora, particularly with regard to economics 
and trade. 
 
SO: So, you were explicitly trying to avoid the protectionist barriers of the 
European Union and indeed of the NAFTA bloc because it seems that, 
when developed countries push free trade, it was – and is – always free 
trade on their own terms? 
 
MM: Yes. I realised that very early. I realised that there would not be any success 
in GATT at all. At that stage, I gave up on GATT and decided that we should 
have a stronger voice through a regional grouping, a strong regional 
grouping.   
 
SO: Please, could I ask you some more questions about the Commonwealth 
in various dimensions? What was your motivation behind deciding to 
host the XVI Commonwealth Games in 1998? 
 
MM: At that time, the Commonwealth Games was never held in any of the smaller 
countries: I didn’t think there was one anywhere. So, we thought that we 
should show that even a developing country can play host to such a major 
games. We did not imagine ourselves playing host to the Olympics. We felt 
that the Commonwealth did represent the world, in a certain way. There were 
developed countries, there were countries coming from all the different 
regions, and there were good athletes among the Commonwealth. So, in a 
way, it is a smaller edition of the Olympics. We would never be able to put on 
the Olympics because of the conditions required. 
 
SO: So, you were emphasising functional cooperation through sport? You 
were opening it up, particularly, to team sports. The Malaysian 
Government’s financial and political support for the Games was 
phenomenal. The XVI Games were the first to be offering assistance and 
acclimatisation for the athletes, and the infrastructure development that 
you initiated to enable the Games was truly impressive.   
 
MM: By that time we were quite prosperous. We had the money. The country was 
doing well, the economy was growing, and we could spare the money. And 
we could show that even a developing country need not be so backward. A 
developing country can develop itself to an extent that it can aspire to play 
host to a function, a meeting, like the Commonwealth Games. 
 
SO: Notwithstanding Malaysia’s impressive growth – particularly in the 
1990s – you had had to endure the battering from the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997/98? 
 
MM: Well, we suffered badly. Our currency was almost half its value. We were 
pressured to accept the IMF, but we had internal problems which did not 
permit us to accept foreign management of our economy. We have these 
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three different races in this country. It is necessary that the three different 
races should share in the wealth of the country fairly. We were doing that 
through affirmative action and we felt sure that if the IMF came in… Well, then 
it is the bottom line that counts. Its economic growth, achievements and all 
that, is not for distribution. We have all this talk about growth with equity. You 
see, it’s not just growth alone. But, since we knew the IMF and the World 
Bank would not care about that, we said, “No, we cannot allow our economy 
to be run by others. We have to do it ourselves.” 
 
SO: I know that Zambia in the 1980s had tried to go a separate road from one 
that was being dictated by the IMF, but President Kaunda was not able 
to sustain it. You, however, achieved a striking success, in direct 
contrast to the prescription from the IMF. I know, Sir, that you pinned 
the ringgit to the dollar, and you also reintroduced currency controls to 
prevent those huge surges of currency outflows. 
 
MM: Well, we knew business likes stability; they like [conditions] to be predictable. 
They had to budget for the year and they cannot budget if the money, the 
currency value, is not stable, and things like that. We understood that. We 
had to grow our country. We had to accept foreign direct investments. So, all 
these factors – together with our internal need to re-structure our economy – 
made us think about another solution, not the IMF solution. Fortunately for us, 
we had the biggest savings in the world: 40% of GDP saved every year, and 
that is very big. It is bigger than any other country. So, we were financially 
strong and we resented this allegation that we were not able to manage our 
finances well. It is not true at all. What was true was the currency traders 
thought that they saw an opportunity to make a pile for themselves. So, they 
said we didn’t know how to manage our economy and therefore the currency 
depreciated. But it was not because of the economy or financial 
management; it was because of currency traders. That is why we went after 
the currency traders. We blamed them and we tried to find ways to stop them 
from fiddling with our currency. So, that was what decided us on this currency 
problem. 
 
SO: Please, could I ask you also about the restructuring of the 
Commonwealth from 1989 through to your decision to step down from 
being Prime Minister in 2003? I know that, at the Kuala Lumpur 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, not only was it a 
supreme success, but also that you were Chairman of the High Level 
Appraisal coming out of that CHOGM to review the Commonwealth, 
including the Secretariat – to see was if it was ‘fit for purpose’, going 
forward. How much energy and time were you able to devote to that, 
though, given the other demands of office? 
 
MM: Well, I didn’t think there would be enough time to complete this review. There 
were lots of things that should be done. I should be seeing all the Heads of 
Government, explaining things to them. Physically, I was not able to do that. 
But I know the situation of the Commonwealth generally, and I know that the 
aim should be to make the Commonwealth much more relevant to the poorer 
countries. 
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SO: This has been your consistent determination: to ensure that the 
Commonwealth supported development, rather than getting side-
tracked with other developed country agendas. At the Harare meeting of 
1991, to what extent were you supportive of Chief Emeka’s decision to 
push good governance as one of the Commonwealth’s core agenda? 
 
MM: Yes, I believe good governance is very important. Because, when we became 
independent, we really had no experience running a country. Malaysians, 
during the colonial period, were not given the top positions: we were always 
subordinate. Fortunately for us, the people who took over were mainly civil 
servants: people who were serving the Government. The Tunku was a 
Government servant, Razak was a Government servant. These people 
understood administration. But where countries fight for independence, there 
were guerrilla leaders and fighters: they were the ones who took over the 
administration and, obviously, while they may be very good in fighting, they 
are not conversant with the need for proper administration. 
 
SO: That was particularly true of Robert Mugabe’s liberation movement 
coming to power, because the fighters-turned-politicians had been 
deprived of the chance to develop their administrative skills. It was 
equally true for the ANC and for SWAPO.  
 
MM: And many other countries where independence came through military action, 
where the leaders of the independence movement naturally expect that when 
they become independent, they will rule the country.   
 
SO: Part of Chief Emeka’s drive for good governance was also tied up with 
his emphasis upon the Commonwealth as an election observer: 
promoting good electoral practice by observation and experience. I 
understand that a Commonwealth electoral monitoring mission came 
here, at your invitation, for the elections in 1990. Do you recall how that 
played out, as far as you were concerned? 
 
MM: Well, we welcomed anybody who wished to look at us and find out whether 
we had conducted the elections properly or not. And we think that every 
country should accept; even if they consider that they are doing the right 
thing, observers should always be welcome. And my assessment is that if, in 
an election, the opposition can win seats, [then] that indicates that the 
election is properly conducted.  But when you have elections in which 90% or 
95% or 99% of those elected come from one party, then I think there is some 
fraudulent act. 
 
SO: Obviously this was the first time that the Commonwealth had put 
together an election observation team since the early 1980s [Uganda; 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe]. Do you recall how closely this team worked with 
you? How these officials went about observing Malaysian elections? 
 
MM: They were often on their own. I don’t remember contacting them. We are 
quite familiar with people being critical about our elections, and they could 
come and observe. We had no fears. But what they did, what they reported, 
was not something that I focussed upon, or learn from, because I think that, in 
Malaysia, when we conduct elections, it is a fair election. 
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SO: Sir, by 1995 there had been a growing view that the Commonwealth 
should take more of a stand against military dictatorships. The regime 
in Nigeria under General Sani Abacha was causing acute concern in the 
Commonwealth. On the eve of the Auckland meeting in 1995, the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni political activists 
took place in direct opposition to the Commonwealth’s plea – and 
President Mandela’s personal plea – for clemency. I know that, at the 
Retreat, the discussion for CMAG was held. Do you recall that 
discussion at all, and the decision? 
 
MM: Not that clearly. 
 
SO: I know that you were at a press conference afterwards, and you were 
asked for your view. You supported the establishment of CMAG. But I 
was struck by the letter that you wrote to President Clinton the following 
year in 1996, in which you said, “CMAG is not doing what it should 
because General Abacha just refuses to see them”.  And yours seemed 
to be a personal plea to President Clinton on the basis of “hard power”: 
to try and get American leverage. I just wondered whether you felt 
CMAG was useful at all in correcting military coup regimes. 
 
MM: I really didn’t think deeply on that issue. It was something that was proposed 
and how if functioned, whether it was successful or not, I didn’t pay much 
attention to it. 
 
SO: Malaysia, of course, served on the CMAG from 1995 to 2002. Did you 
allocate responsibility to the Malaysian representative while you 
focused on other issues of greater importance? 
 
MM: Yes. 
 
SO: Please, overall what were your relations like with other Commonwealth 
Heads of Government? Did you choose to have a particularly good 
working relationship with certain Commonwealth leaders? 
 
MM: Well, I did make friends with a number of them: particularly those who 
became involved with the Langkawi Dialogue and the South African dialogue. 
I became very friendly with them. I knew them personally. It goes beyond just 
official contact: they were my friends and I feel very comfortable with them.   
 
SO: Yes. Would you name any particular Commonwealth heads with whom 
you formed a close working relationship? In your memoirs, you remark 
on the importance of personal chemistry between heads. 
 
MM: I was very friendly with Robert Mugabe, with Sam Nujoma, and later on with 
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. They were people who were active and 
they were facing problems, and I became involved with them quite closely, 
especially Sam Nujoma, where he was struggling to gain his country’s 
independence. So, these people I knew very well because they stayed 
longer. They remain the leaders even if they are not officially leaders, and 
were respected as leaders by their own countries. And some of those I got to 
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know, but by the next Commonwealth meeting they had disappeared and 
somebody else took their place. So, it was difficult to develop good relations. 
 
SO: Yes. I can understand that importance of ongoing personal friendship in 
this Commonwealth practice of ‘summitry’. Sir, on this question of 
longevity of office, how important do you feel the Queen was to helping 
support the Commonwealth? 
 
MM: Well, I think she was a symbol – someone who was regarded as Head of the 
Commonwealth – and she made it a point to visit the countries when there 
was a Commonwealth meeting. She came here, to us, for the Commonwealth 
meeting and she graciously accepted our request that she stay in the guest 
house that we provided, rather than on the ship. And, of course, all 
Commonwealth heads called on her during the meeting and she had been 
very well briefed. When she talked with me, she knew about Malaysia, 
particularly the climate! 
 
SO: Please, Sir, if I could ask as my last question… What do you feel about 
the future of the Commonwealth now? 
 
MM: Again, any organisation has a future, provided it is properly led and it sticks to 
the objective of that organisation. No one should have extra influence on an 
organisation. We should always regard ourselves as equals in the 
organisation, and we should be concerned about each other’s problems. We 
have a need to understand problems that are faced by different members of 
an organisation. In that sense, I support the Commonwealth, and I think it can 
play a big role. For example, when we formed this group, the Langkawi 
Dialogue Group, later on others outside the Commonwealth appealed to be 
members and we accepted them. Of course, the Commonwealth cut us off 
completely from any financing because we were not confined to the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So you feel that the Commonwealth and its role in functional 
cooperation, in helping with training in technical and management 
skills, that these are avenues and areas in which the Commonwealth 
can be enormously beneficial? 
 
MM: Yes, it is. But still, contact and understanding our policies are important. For 
example, I had a problem with Britain when I was Prime Minister, and Mrs 
Thatcher decided to raise fees for the students coming from Malaysia – not 
from Europe. Europe, which can afford higher fees, was not affected by the 
new rates. I met Mrs Thatcher and I told her, “You are making a big mistake, 
because when students study in the UK and they come back and work in 
Malaysia, whether it is in business or in Government, their tendency is to refer 
to the place where they studied, if they want to recommend any company or 
any system. But, when you cut them off, you lose future relations with these 
people. And if these people would recommend, those countries would 
benefit.” After that, she decided to give some scholarships for Malaysian 
students. But this is what is missing now in the organisation. They don’t 
realise that getting to know each other is very important. If you know each 
other well, you want to do business with people you know well. You don’t do 
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business with strangers. Most people in organisations like this don’t think 
about the importance of getting to know each other. 
 
SO: So, just to conclude then… Do you feel the Commonwealth was useful 
for Malaysia to enable Malaysians, at various levels, to get to know the 
world outside? I know that you were determined that Malaysians should 
not be – as the proverb says – ‘like frogs under a shell’! 
 
MM: Yes. [Laughter] If you go to African countries, I think they know Malaysia well. 
Of course, we are members of the OIC and other Arab countries know us 
well. Most developing countries would know Malaysia quite well. Why? It is 
because we believe in contacts. We offer them some help for training, for 
example. We call it ‘technical cooperation’. We are not trying to teach them 
anything: we’re trying to cooperate with them. And that is one of the results of 
getting to know the poorer countries of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: I know that you’ve spent millions of ringgit on this particularly important 
form of cooperation. And that it’s not aid: it is cooperation. 
 
MM: Cooperation. We want to learn from them as much as they want to learn from 
us. 
 
SO: Yes. Sir, thank you very much indeed. I’m very grateful for your time. 
 
MM: Okay, you’re welcome. 
 
 
 [END OF AUDIOTAPE] 
 
 
 
 
 
